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Abstract-This paper analyzes a spam rejection scheme at
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) sessions. This scheme
utilizes a layer-3 e-mail pre-classification technique to estimate
e-mail classes before an SMTP session ends. We study the spam
rejection scheme using discrete-time Markov chain analysis and
analyze the performance of the proposed scheme under different
e-mail traffic loads and service capacities. The proposed scheme
reduces the e-mail volume to be queued and processed by e-
mail servers. This reduces non-spam e-mail queuing delay and
loss, and protects e-mail servers from being overloaded by spam
traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current spam control systems are post-acceptance sys-
tems [1]. E-mails are first received and buffered in a common
queue before spam detection is performed. An e-mail class is
only known after the e-mail is classified, i.e., after the Simple
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [2] session ends. During heavy
spam traffic, the non-spam e-mail delivery could be delayed
and lost. Spam is best stopped before it is being received
by the receiving e-mail server (also known as mail transfer
agent, MTA) [3]. Spam detection during SMTP sessions is
impossible without passing e-mail class hints (within the e-
mail) or without a fast e-mail class estimation.
A fast and accurate e-mail class estimation on MTAs is
possible by pre-classifying e-mails at layer 3 (the packet
level) [4]. This paper analyzes a spam rejection scheme during
SMTP sessions to reduce the number of e-mails received for
delivery by MTAs and hence, non-spam queuing delay and
loss probability. We model and estimate the performance of
our proposed scheme at the receiving MTA using discrete-
time Markov chain analysis. Our results show that the non-
spam queuing delay and loss probability can be reduced due
to the reduction in the number of e-mails to be processed by
an MTA.
This paper is structured as follows. We discuss related works
in Section II. Section III describes the spam rejection scheme.
We model the proposed scheme in Section IV and analyze its
performance in Section V. We conclude and state directions
for future works in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Techniques to prioritize e-mail servicing on MTAs have
been proposed in [1], [5]. Prioritizing e-mail servicing gives
better non-spam delay and loss probability even under heavy
e-mail loading and high spam prior [5]. Such techniques
deal with e-mails after they are received for queuing. Our
proposed scheme deals with e-mails before they are received
for queuing.
A similar e-mail proxy technique that throttles attempted
spam connections has been proposed in [6] using a proxy
server due to the need for layer-7 spam detection. The authors'
recent work showed that spam can be pre-classified at layer 3
anywhere in the network without the need to reassemble
email messages [4]. By pre-classifying and tagging e-mail
packets at intermediate nodes, a fast e-mail class estimation
can be performed by the receiving MTAs. The layer-3 e-mail
classification detects spam with 2% false positive (fp) and
27% false negative (fn) [4].
Spam control on outbound e-mail traffic can effectively
control spam [7], especially when illegal zombie-relayed spam
probability is high [8]. A zombie detection technique has been
proposed in [9] by heuristically analyzing spam transfer and
rejection behaviors from MTA logs. In our proposed spam
rejection scheme, the failure in sending an e-mail, including
failed spam deliveries to valid e-mail addresses are also
negatively acknowledged and logged by sending MTAs. This
provides easier log analysis compared to [9] since users with
high e-mail rejection statistics are most likely relaying spam
and not false positive senders.
III. PROPOSED SPAM REJECTION SCHEME DURING SMTP
SESSIONS
Fig. 1 shows an example of an SMTP session between
two MTAs. Lines with S are those sent by the sender MTA,
whereas lines with R are those sent by the receiving MTA. On
line 05, the envelope address MAIL FROM used to forward
the e-mail does not have to be the same as the address From
on line 11, which specifies the author's e-mail address. The
fields To and carbon copy (Cc) specify the e-mail recipients.
The Date field specifies the date and time of the e-mail. As
specified in RFC2822 [10], all header fields as well as e-mail
body are free text input, which need not to be valid and can
be easily forged.
Layer-3 pre-classification allows e-mail class estimation
before an SMTP session ends, i.e., before an e-mail is accepted
for queuing (line 21 in Fig. 1). The receiving MTA can issue a
temporary failure notice (tempfail) [2] to deny e-mail receipt
before the session ends. With this scheme, when a server's
resources are low or the traffic loading is higher than the
service capacity, a server could reject spam e-mails and deny
an e-mail transfer at its SMPT session.
Fig. 2 illustrates the proposed spam rejection scheme during
SMTP sessions. Current statistics show that more than two-
thirds of the e-mail traffic over the Internet are spam e-
mails [8]. For inbound spam control, spam transfers can be
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01 S telnet smtp.mail.net 25
Trying <IP address>... Connected to smtp.mail.net
(<IP address>). Escape character is 'IA.
02 R 220 smtp.example.net ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.11;
Wed, 27 Dec 2006 12:00:00 +0100
03 S EHLO smtp.mail.org
04 R 250-smtp.mail.net Hello smtp.mail.org <IP address>,
pleased to meet you
05 S MAIL FROM: <alice@mail.org>
06 R 250 2.1.0 <alice@mail.org>... Sender ok
07 S RCPT TO: <bob@mail.net>
08 R 250 2.1.5 <bob@mail.net>... Recipient ok
09 S DATA
10 R 354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
11 S From: Alice <alice@mail.org>
12 S To: Bob <bob@mail.net>
13 S Cc: Charles <charles@mail.com>
14 S Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2006 12:00:00 +0100 (CEST)
15 S Subject: An E-mail Example
16 S
17 S Hello,
18 S
19 S This is an e-mail example, complete with a header
and a body.
20 S
21 R 250 2.0.0 <queue ID> Message accepted for delivery
22 S QUIT
23 R 221 2.0.0 smtp.mail.net closing connection
Fig. 1. E-mail transfer during an SMTP session.
Packets are classified and tagged in-transit spammers'
7/- ___ MTAs
Fig. 2. Proposed spam rejection during SMTP sessions. Layer-3 e-mail pre-
classification enables spam rejection of inbound spam and outbound spam
during relaying.
denied without the need for queuing. This reduces the amount
of e-mails to be processed by an MTA.
More than 45°0 of spam are relayed by zombie systems [8].
Spam rejection during SMTP sessions enables outbound spam
control during relaying through legitimate MTAs. Similar to
spam rejection at receiving MTAs, relaying MTAs can reject
spam transfers at their SMTP sessions. Since rejection is at the
SMTP session (layer 7), the delivery failure notice is issued to
the sender MTA and can be used to detect zombie systems [9].
IV. MODELING THE PROPOSED SPAM REJECTION SCHEME
Fig. 3 shows the model of the proposed spam rejection
scheme. E-mail packets are first reassembled (by module R) to
form complete e-mails. During reassembly, e-mail classes can
be estimated without significant delays when e-mail packets
have been pre-classified and tagged with packet scores [4]. We
define Pa as the probability that an e-mail is accepted during
an SMTP session and queued in queue W. We also define Pd
as the probability that an e-mail is dropped during an SMTP
session. Then, e-mails are queued before being processed by a
layer-7 spam detector C with a service probability c. Then, C
decides whether to forward an e-mail to the recipient's mailbox
or to a junk e-mail folder.
E- ail server
Fig. 3. The model of the proposed spam rejection during SMTP sessions.
Suspected spam e-mails are dropped to reduce the amount of e-mails to be
processed by an MTA.
The e-mail arrival can be measured by the e-mail inter-
arrival time, which follows the exponential distribution [11].
The delay to detect spam can be measured by its service
time, which is not sensitive to e-mail size and could be
modeled using exponential distribution [1]. Define ta as the
minimum e-mail inter-arrival time and ti as the minimum
service time. Choosing a time step T= minT(taJct) ensures
that an M/M/1/B Markov chain model [12] can be used to
model the queue. The e-mail arrival probability can be defined
as a= T/ta, where ta is the average e-mail inter-arrival time.
Similarly, the service probability can be defined as c = Tltc,
where tc is the average e-mail service time.
Due to the retransmission policy, a compliant MTA will
attempt retransmission. We assume that spammers' own MTAs
(not zombie systems) do not attempt retransmissions under
the assumption that the recipients' addresses are invalid [1].
We also assume that senders' histories are maintained by the
receiving MTA to accept e-mails after kmax retransmission
attempts. Given ps as the spam prior and p, as the probability
that spam is sent by a zombie, Pa and Pd are defined as
Pa = a(1 -p,) + ap5(f. + pztn)
Pd = a(I -ps)fp(kmax - 1)
+apstn( +pz(kmax -1))
(1)
(2)
where tn = 1-fn is the true negative. Note that retransmission
increases Pa by only one attempt since attempts 1 < k < kmax
are rejected.
An M/M/1/B queue W of size B with the arrival probability
Pa and service probability c can be analyzed using Markov
chain analysis [12]. Assuming that an e-mail cannot arrive and
be served in the same time step, the queue can be described
by the state transition matrix
F 1-Pa bc ... 0 1
a f 0 O
P (3)
0 0 ... f bc
0 0° Pad 1 -bc
where b = 1-Pa, d = 1-c, and f = Pac+bd. The equilibrium
distribution vector w [12] can be expressed as
W = [ Wo Wl ... WB-1 WB] (4)
where wi is the probability that queue W contains i e-mails.
At steady-state, solving Pw = w and ,ij=o wi = 1 [12] gives
(1 -pd)pidmax(o,i- 1)
We 1 +p(C pBdB) frOiB5
where P= Pa/I(bc).
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We are interested in two performance metrics, the non-
spam queuing delay and loss probability. The average queue
throughput, T, is defined as the probability that an e-mail be
served [12] and is defined as
T = c(l -wo)
From [12], the average queue occupancy Q is given by
B
Q = EZwi
i=O
From
given
(6)
(7)
Little's result [12], the average queuing delay D, is
by D-Q _oB
T c(l- so) (8)
A non-spam e-mail is lost when the queue is full, or when
a non-spam e-mail arrives and the queue is not served in a
single time step (i.e., t, > T). For the spam rejection scheme,
the non-spam loss probability can be estimated as
Ls a(l psP)WBPad (9)
Pa
We analyzed typical single-queue scheme at receiving
MTAs in our recent work on prioritized e-mail servicing [5].
The single-queue scheme does not support spam rejection
during SMTP sessions. The queue performance metrics can be
obtained using M/M/1/B queue model with input probability
a and service probability c. From [5], the non-spam queuing
delay of the current scheme, D is defined as
B
D = Ei=ols (10)
c(l- so)
where si is the probability that the common queue contains i
e-mails. The non-spam loss probability of the current scheme,
L is defined as
L = sBad(1 p5) (11)
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the performance of our proposed spam
rejection scheme. For all figures in this section, horizontal
axes represent the arrival to service ratio 0 < a/c < 2, where
a/c > 1 and a/c < 1 illustrate an under-provisioned and
an over-provisioned MTA, respectively. An under-provisioned
MTA could not process all incoming e-mails. The vertical
axes are for non-spam delay or loss probability for B =
50,T = Os, and kmax = 2. Dashed lines represent the
current (without SMTP rejection) and solid lines represent the
proposed scheme.
A. Effect of ps
Fig. 4 shows the performance of the proposed spam rejec-
tion scheme when 0.3 < ps < 0.7, fp = 0.02, fn = 0.27, and
pz = 0.45. Fig. 4(a) shows that the queuing delays decrease
with increasing ps, where Ds < D for all a/c values. The
non-spam loss probabilities show similar trend to the non-
spam delay, as shown in Fig. 4(b). Both Ls and L decrease as
ps increases with Ls < L for all a/c values. Since ps directly
affects Pa, we can conclude that higher ps results in higher
reduction in spam to be processed, and hence, lower non-spam
queuing delay and loss probability.
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Fig. 4. Effects of p, on the performance of rejecting spam during SMTP
sessions when p, E {0.3,0.7}, 0 < a/c < 2, fp = 0.02, fn = 0.27,
pz = 0.45, kmax 2, and T = 0.1s. (a) Non-spam queuing delays. b)
Non-spam loss probabilities.
B. Effect of fp
According to Equation (2), the input to the queue in our
proposed spam rejection scheme, Pa, is not influenced by the
changes in fp and hence, D, and Ls.
C. Effect of fn
Fig. 5 shows the effect of fn on the non-spam queuing
delays and loss probabilities when p5 = 0.5, fp = 0.02,
0 < fn < 0.5, and pz = 0.45. Fig. 5(a) shows that the
queuing delays increase as fn increases with D, < D for
all a/c values. Similar trend is observed for the non-spam
loss probabilities, where increases in fn increase L, and L
(Ls < L for all alc values). False negative, fn affects the
input probability to the queues, Pa. Increases in fn increase
the input probability to the queue and result in increases in
D] and Ls.
D. Effect ofpz
One of the main issues of spam rejection during SMTP
sessions is zombie-relayed spam e-mails. Fig. 6 shows the
effect of pz on D, and L, when p, = 0.5, fp = 0.02, fn =
0.5, and 0 < pz < 0.9. Fig. 6(a) shows that D, and D increase
as pz increases, where Ds < D for all alc values. Similarly,
Fig. 6(b) shows Ls and L (Ls < L for all a/c values). Since
pz affects Pa, increases in pz result in increases in Ds and Ls.
From our analysis, we observed that the value of pz < 90%
gives better performance than the current scheme.
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Fig. 5. Effects of fn on the performance of rejecting spam during SMTP
sessions when p= 0.3, 0 < a/c < 2, fp = 0.02, fn {0,0.5},
p, = 0.45, kmax= 2, and T = 0.1s. (a) Non-spam queuing delays. b)
Non-spam loss probabilities.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed and evaluated a spam rejection scheme during
SMTP sessions. We analyzed the performance and cost of
the proposed scheme. We found that the proposed spam
rejection scheme exhibits better non-spam delay and non-spam
loss probability than the single-queue scheme without SMTP
rejection. The proposed scheme protects MTAs from being
overloaded by huge incoming spam traffic.
This work can be further extended to proposing a scheme
to detect and reduce the zombie problem and illegal spam
relaying. It can also be extended to spam throttling beyond
MTAs by utilizing the layer-3 e-mail classification technique
and developing a hardware architecture for e-mail class esti-
mation.
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